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In the Sttprem.e Court of the
State of Utah
THE VALLEY MORTUARY, a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
CASE NO. 7350

vs.
UONEL FAIRBANKS,
Defendant and Appellant.
J

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
The matters appearing in the Judgment Roll are set
forth in extenso in the first 14. pages of Appellant's Brief,
and reflect the background and basis for the issues involved
on the appeal. For convenience of the Court in keeping
clear the matters involved in the discussion, we shall, in this
brief, refer to the parties by name; the defendant and appellant as FAIRBANKS and the plaintiff as THE VALLEN.
As we understand the pleadings, the record, and Fairbanks'
brief, there is really only one question involved on this appeal which arises as follows:
Fairbanks, a m~rtician or undertaker, at Eureka, sold
his establishment, stock in traQe, and good will, to The Val-
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ley for a consideration of $5,500.00 under a written agreement containing, inter alia, a provision, that Fairbanks
would not for a specified period operate a "mortuary or
funeral business in Utah or Juab Counties, in his own name
or through a subsidiary or third party." Fairbanks received his money, turned the physical property to The Valley, and left the restricted area. Sometime thereafter he
sought and was granted a modification
of the agreement
.
.
eliminating from the restricted area that part of Utah County lying north of Provo City. He then set up an establishment and entered into a mortuary, funeral, or undertaking
business in Orem, north of Provo. Shortly thereafter, in
the operation of the mortuary business, Fairbanks began
an invasion of Provo, Utah County south of Provo, and Ju_ab County, for undertaking business; receiving bodies, embalming, selling caskets, arranging and ·conducting funerals and burials in the restricted area. His activities in this
regard continued to increase and expand until this action
was commenced by The V.alley to enjoin Fairbanks from
violating the restrictive clauses of his contract of sale, and
as an incident, sought damages for the past breaches of contract. The principal issue involved, the nub of the controversy, the crux of the case, is as to whether or not injunctive. relief is a proper remedy in the action. All other matters raised <;>r discussed are merely incidental to this question. Fairbanks raises and argues this question in three
of the five ·points (first,. third an~ fifth) discussed in his
brief. Point 2 admittedly loses its significance if the
action sounds in equity, and Point 4 consists. of a single.
statement that in Fairbanks' opinion the Court did not give
enough weight to some of his testimony.
.
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POINT 1
Is equitab\e or injrmctive relief a proper remedy for the
Court to apply in this action? Fairbanks assails the
injtmction: first, from a standpoint of pleading; second,
as a 1natter of construction of the couh~ct.
The question of pleading is posed by Fairbanks' contention that the co1nplaint does not lay a basis for the interposition of the Court's equitable powers. Like many other
activities of man, the art of pleading under common law
gradually moved and degenerated itself into a formalism, a
rule of thumb, a practice where a rule and not a reason was
the guide. The pleader \Vas required to make his facts fit
the stereotyped form of pleading, rather than the pleading
fit the facts. The basis and objective of the code-the innovation brought about by it-was to make the facts and
not the form the invoking power, the force that calls and
brings into play the powers and facilities of the Court. A
pleading is to be tested, not by its form, but by its content.
It follows, therefore, that facts and not conclusions must
be pleaded. It is from the factual substance, not the conclusions the pleader may have drawn, (hat a pleading must
be tested.
What must be alleged in a particular case depends upon
what is essential to a cause of action in that sort of case.
In any given case we are not helped much by references or
citations to general rules of pleading. The application of
such rules vary with the nature of the cause of action. We
do not mould our facts to fit rules of pleading-we plead
the facts, and then through the processes of legal reason,
determine if the facts stated show a picture or condition
which calls for the Court to determine the rights involved,
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and to react in a certain way to achieve that purpose. 3
Bancroft Code Pldg., 2553, ,4. The first question, therefore,
as to the sufficiency of any pleading is: What is essential to
a right of action in a case of that kind? The second question: Are those essentials found within the pleading?
Let us apply these tests to the pleading in the case at
bar. In an action brought for violation of a contract torefrain from entering business in competition with the person
to whom the violator of the contract has sold his business
and good will, what facts are essential to show a proper
cause or justification for the exercise of the equitable powers of a Court? In short-what facts must plaintiff plead
in a case such as this to lay a foundation for injunctive relief? He must show: An interest in the subject· matter;
an invasion by defendant of a right plaintiff has therein;
and facts from which the Court may say that equitable relief is the most efficient and effective remedy to be applied
in the situation to protect .the parties in their rights.
It is not an uncommon practice to quote the old worn,
hackneyed expressions that one must plead inadequacy of
legal remedies, and irreparable injury before equity intervenes. Such expressions originated and became shopworn,
if not hallowed, in the days and practice when law and
equity were ~eparate and distinct, administered by separate tribunals, under different rules of practice; and when
equity was considered not a right but a benevolence of the
King, which he could refuse or extend in those cases where
the law and its procedure, because of its universality, was
inadequate. With the adoption of our code, the distinction
between legal and equitable forums, between legal and equitable practice, was abolished, and law and equity is now
administered by the same Courts, in the same actions, be-
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t\veen the same parties, being parts of the same jurisdiction,
and applied by tl1e Court as seems proper, to accomplish the
results \Vhich the facts indicate the parties are entitled to,
and which should therefore be the results of the action.
Constitution of Utah~ Art. \Till, Sec. 19; Norbach vs. Board
of Directors, 84 Ut. 506, 37 Pac. (2) 339; Spanish Fork West
Field v. District Court, 99 Ut. 527, 104 Pac. (2) 353.
It thus appears that the adequacy of the complaint is
determined by this test: Are there facts stated from which
the Court can say that suit for damages would not be an
adequate, efficient and effective remedy to protect the
rights plaintiff has under its contract?
The complaint alleges and shows that Fairbanks sold
a going bttsiness to The Valley for a substantial sum of
money, and that part of the consideration The Valley received for the money so paid Fairbanks was the good will
of Fairbanks and of the business sold in the restricted area,
coupled \vith a covenant by Fairbanks not to enter or engage in competition with The Valley within the restricted
zone for a specified time. It alleges in definite and positive
terms that Flairbanks is actively and openly violating his
restrictive covenant, injuring The Valley's business, and
undermining the good will he had sold and for which he
had been paid; and concludes with a prayer for an injunction; then for damages and costs. In an assault such as
this upon the complaint those facts are admitted, as they
are upon demurrer. (At the time the injunCftion was granted Fairbanks had answered, admitting he was operating
a funeral business in the restricted area, arid alleging in effect that he intends to continue so to do. See paragraph 5
and subdivisions (a) and (c) of Fairbanks' further and affirmative defense.)
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Fairbanks states that the only basis for equitable relief is the prayer, and that the prayer is not a part of the
complaint. True, the prayer is not part of the allegations,
but it is the assertion of the kind, nature, and extent of relief plaintiff seeks; and the relief he can obtain is limited
by the prayer. It is therefore to be considered by the
Court in construing and interpreting the pleading, since the
Court must determine whether the party has stated a case
for the relief which he seeks.
'"The character of the bill depends upon the prayer,
which defines its objects, and points out the defendants and the remedies and redress sought." 10 Ency.
Pldg. and Prac. 961.
The prayer serves to show the kind of relief to which
plaintiff conceives himself to be entitled, and indicate the
object which he seeks to accomplish. Arrington v. Liscom,
34 Cal. 365, 94 Am. Dec. 722; Rochester v. Wells Fargo, 87
Kan. 164, 123 Pac. 729, 40 U R. A. (N. S.) 1095.
0. G. Merager v. Alex Turnbull, 2 Wash. (2d) 711, 99
Pac. (2) 434, 127 A. L. R. 1142, 1151, a case involving a sale
of undertaking business, the Court says:
"The argument of appellants that the respondent's
failure to raise in the pleadings or argue at the trial
the issue of the right of Bruce Turnbull to use the new
building precludes the relief of enjoining use of the
building by Bruce Turnbull is answered by the prayer
of respondent in his complaint for injunctive relief
against both appellants and for such other and further
relief as might to the court appear just and equitable
in the premises. Under that prayer the trial court had
the right to grant any and all relief which was deemed
justified under the circumstances.''
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Where the con1plaint sets out facts which will support
either an action at la\v or a suit in equity, the character of
the action may be determined by the relief demanded. Ency.
Pldg. and Prac. 16; 777-8.
"Where the facts stated entitle the plaintiff to
elect between t\'vu remedies, to either of which the facts
sho\V him to be entitled, the prayer may determine the
character of the action, because it is in itself an election. Corry v. Gaynor, 21 0 St. 277."
"\Vhether a petition is at la\v or in equity is to be
determined by the prayer and conclusion. Pella Christian Church v. Scholte, 2 Ia. 27."
Where there are two statutes prescribing the same
form of complaint in (1) an action for the recovery of
money judgment and (2) an action foreclosing a lien for
taxes, the prayer of the complaint will determine the nature
of the action. People v. Mier, 24 Cal. 61.
1 Bancroft Code Pldg. 35. The prayer may be consul- ·
ted in determining whether a pleading was intended to include any specific character of relief, or in interpreting the
language of a complaint or petition. Where the facts may
constitute two or more different causes of action, and may
authorize different judgments, the prayer becomes significant, and may determine the nature of the action. Aid ·v.
Bowerman, 132 Wash. 319, 232 Pac. 297; Nevada County,
etc. Canal Co. v. Kidd, 37 Cal. 282;· Arrington v. Liscom,
34 Cal. 365, 94 Am. Dec. 722; People v. Mier, 24 Cal. 61.
"In case the pleader has stated a cause of action
in equity and also one at law in such a manner as to
have it uncertain which one he intends to pursue, resort may be had to the prayer for relief to determine
the character of the action. Kinns v. Gaslin, 24 Neb.
310, 38 N. W. 797."
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The injunction here involved is not an injunction pen~
dente lite, but one entered after issue joined and full hear~
ing had, and submission of the cause upon the merits.
There is no claim that the evidence before the Court did
not, or does not, justify the injunction. The contention is
that the complaint did not set forth facts showing the need
of equitable restraints. Fairbanks argues the point as
though the question were one a-rising upon a temporary
writ issued upon the complaint, rather than a writ issued
after trial upon the merits. We shall advert to this fact
later. At the moment we shall confine ourselves to appel~
lant's position.
For a pleader to say that "he has no adequate remedy
at law" or that "his legal remedies are inadequate" adds
nothing to his pleading; it states no facts and is merely a
conclusion of the pleader.. 3 Bancroft Cook Pldg. 1548;
McBride v. Newlin, 61 Pac. 577; 129 Cal. 36; McLean v.
Farmers Highline Canal, 44 Colo. 184, 96 Pac. 16; Davitt
v. American Bankers, 124 Cal. 99, 56 Pac. 775; Wicks v.
Metcalf, 83 Ore. 687, 163 Pac. 434; L. R. A. 1918A 493.
What he must show are the facts from which the Court
may deduce conclusions with respect to what are proper or
necessary .remedies. Utah Assn. Creditmen v. Jones, 49 Ut.
519, 164 Pac. 1029; 3 Bancroft Code -Pldg. 1548; Schuyler
v. Broughton, 65 Cal. 252, 3 Pac. 870; Van Buskirk v. Bond,
52 Ore. 234, 96 Pac. 1103; Galbreath Gas v. Lindsey, 35
Okla. 235, 129 Pac. 45.
From the facts may not the Court conclude that
damages would not be an adequate, an efficient or an effective remedy?
In determining whether an action is a law case, or one
sounding in equity, the Court looks at the plaintiff's right,
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the grievance complained of, and considers the question:
What is the proper and effective remedy to protect plaintiff in his rights? If an a\vard of damages, a money judgment, will properly protect plaintiff's rights, the case is one
at la\v; if such judgment would not a1nply protect plaintiff's rights and redress his wrongs, the action sounds in
equity and the Court will administer its equitable powers
to achieve the necessary, desirable and proper end. In actions under restrictive covenants in connection with the
sale of a business, or of good will, the Courts uniformly
hold that the action is equitable, and that the remedy at law
is inadequate, and the continued injury in its nature irreparable; that such conclusions are impelled from the type of
the case and the wrong complained of, and need not be further pleaded. In a recent case, involving the sale of an abstract business, answering the same point raised here, the
Court said:
"It was not necessary, in this kind of case, for the
plaintiffs to shov1 irreparable injury, or that they had
no adequate remedy at law. Anderson v. Rowland, ·
18 Tex. Civ. App. 460, 44 S. W. 911; Goldberg vs. Soltes, Tex. Civ. App.; 32 S. W. 2d 246; U>max v. Trull,
Tex. Civ. App. 232 S. W. 861; Red Ball Stage Lines v.
Griffin, Tex. C'iv. App.; 275 S. W. 454; Clay v. Richardson, Tex. Cl.v. App.; 290 S. \V. 235. We refer especially
to the opinion in Anderson v. Rowland, supra.
That plaintiffs need not prove the extent to which
they have been injured by the violations of the contract,
or that they have been injured at all, may be demonstrated by stating that a threatened violation of this
contract might have been enjoined, even though no
violation had yet taken place, and though no injury
had yet been· suffered. The purchasers of a business
and good will, where the seller had agreed not to com-
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pete, are not bound to wait until the contract has been
breached and the damage has been done before seeking an injunction ...
As is recognized by the authorities above cited, an
injunction may be the only satisfactory relief available
in a case of this kind. In no other way can plaintiffs
obtain what they purchased from defendant." Moore
v. Duggan Abstract Co., et al; 154 S. W. 2d 519, 520, 1.
We. quote from Anderson v. Rowland, 44 S. W. 914:
''The mere fact that a breach of the covenant is
intended is a sufficient ground for the interference of
the court by injunction. A covenantee has the right
to have the actual enjoyment of the property modo et
forma, as stipulated for by him. It is no answer to say
that the act complained of will inflict no injury on him,
or will be even beneficial to him. It is for the plaintiff
to judge whether the agreement shall be kept, as far as
he is concerned, or whether he will permit it to be violated. It is not necessary that he should show that
any damage has been done. It being established that
the acts of the defendant are a violation of the contract, the court will protect the complainant in the enjoyment of the right he has purchased. 2 High, Inj.
Para. 1158."
In Angier v. Webber, 14 Allen 211, 92 Am. Dec. 748,
the Massachussetts court said:
"For this violation of this covenant the plaintiff
is entitled to relief in equity. An action at law will furnish no adequate remedy. The damages are, in their
nature, such as not to be susceptible of proof or exact
computation, and the injury caused by the acts of the
defendants is a constantly recurring one, for which
multiplied suits at law would afford but an imperfect
remedy. 2 Story, Eq. Para. 925; 2 Daniell, Ch. Prac.
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1760; Williams v. Williams, 2 Swanst. 253.'' To same
effect 2 High, Inj. (3d Ed.) Para. 1142-1158.
In Lutz v. Vlestern Iron and Metal Company, 190 Cal.
554, 213 Pac., on page 965, the court states thus:
"From the nature of the situation the injury or
da.rnage that \vill accrue to respondent if appellants are
permitted to do the threatened acts in the name attempted to be appropriated is plain. A pleader is not required to describe in extenso by a superfluity of \Vords
a result that must inevitably follo\v, provided the premises of a stated proposition be acceded to. Can there
be any doubt as to the natural and logical effect the
competition described in the complaint would have on
respondent's business?"
The same court, in Moore v. Massini, 32 Cal. 595, says:
"Should the threat be fulfilled the plaintiff vvould
be deprived of a part of the substance of his inheritance \Vhich could not be specifically replaced * * *
the injury is irreparable in itself. Inasmuch as plaintiff's rights to the remedy by injunction has its origin
in the nature of the injury complained of, it was of
course, unnecessary to aver matters merely adventitious."
The court goes on to point out that where a threatened
injury goes to the substance of plaintiffs rights, not the
equivalent of money, it is irreparable by the definition of
that term.
In Charles T. Granger v. Lawrence L. Craven, (159
Minn. 296, 199 N. W. 10) 52 A. L. R. 1356, the court said:
''We do not so far forget that the usual and most
important function of courts of justice is rather to
maintain and enforce contracts than to enable parties
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thereto to escape their obligation on the pre.text of
public policy, unless it clearly appears that they contravene public rights or the public welfare. James
Quirk Milling Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 98
Minn. 22, 116 Am. St. Rep. 336, 107 N. W. 742, following Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. Co. v. Voiget, 176 U. S.
498, 44 R. ed. 560, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385.
. We consider that public policy requires the enforcement of this contract as the parties wrote it, ·rather than judicial permission for another surgeon to
practice in Rochester.
If defendant had bought out the plaintiff, he certainly would have exacted a covenant preventing plaintiff from re-entering practice in competition with him.
That is, he would have protected his newly purchased
good will from invasion by its former possessor. That
sort of a covenant, otherwise reasonable, has never .
been successfully challenged.
It would be most uncomplimentary to defendant
to suppose that he would not, were he to open an office in Rochester, attract to himself at once and automatically, a substantial number of plaintiff's patients.
* * * That consideration shows both the propriety of the restrictive covenant, and the sureness with
which irreparable injury to plaintiff will follow unless
defendant is restrained by injunction from a breach
of that covenant. We need no evidence to show that
substantial injury would follow othenvise, and it would
be the kind of injury for which the legal remedy is inadequat.e. (Boldface ours.)
There is so much authority on this subject that
any attempt here to review it is prohibited by propriety. The task has been admirably performed in the
annotations appearing in 9 A. L. R. 1456 and 20 A. L.
R. 86. The latter supplements and ·brings down to
date (1922) the former.
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But, given a legitiinate interest protected to a
reasonable degree, \Vhere damage beyond the power
of la\v to prevent or make good is reasonably sure to
follo\v a breach of the protecting ·covenant, its breach
should be prevented by injunction. This is such a
case.''
The rule is laid down in 43 C. J. S. 567, as follows:
"Where a nestablished business has been sold with
its good \vill, and there is a valid covenant not to compete, a breach is regarded as the controlling factor,
and injunctive relief follo\vs almost as a matter of
course. In such cases the damage is presumed to be
irreparable, and the remedy at law is considered inadequate." See also: Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co.,
204 Minn. 300, 283 N. W. 561; Malakoff Gin Co. vs.
Riddlesperger, 108 Tex. 273, 192 S. W. 530; 32 C. j.
217, note 11 and 12."
Where the injury complained of is one which is in its
nature irreparable or one which from its nature damage is
not an adequate remedy, allegations of irreparable injury
for inadequacy of legal remdy are unnecessary. Cal. Jur.
Vol. 14, para. 66; Burris v. Rodriguez, 22 Cal. App. 645,
135 Pac. 1105. In Cal. Jur. 67, it is said:
"If the ultimate facts pleaded warrant the granting of an injunction, or the ultimate facts proved warrant the granting of an injunction, it is the duty of the
court to grant such relief."
We may summarize this matter in a series of terse
statements- from 10 Encyc. Pldg. and Prac, as follows:
"P. 943. Whether the bill shows a plaintiff entitled to relief must be considered with reference to
the nature, character and condition of the. property or
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rights to be protected. Citing Shipley v. Ritter, 7 Md.
408.
P. 952. An injury is irreparable when it is of such
a nature that the injured party cannot be adequately
compensated therefore in damages, or when the damages which result therefrom cannot be measured by

any certain pecuniary standard.
In determining what is an irreparable injury regard is had not only to its magnitude but to its character and it is irreparable in the sense herein when the
plaintiff could not be considered as in the same position after a money judgment as he was had the wrong
not been committed. There are rights which though
exercised over property and dependent on it, the violation of which cannot be adequately redressed by any
recovery of a mere surn of money. See Jones v. Brandon, 60 Miss. 556.
P. 9554. By the term 'The inadequacy of the remedy by damages' is meant that the damages obtainable
at law are not such a ·compensation as will in effect,
though _not in. specie, __p)2,ce the parties in the position
in \Vhich they formerly stood. The fact that the
arnount of damages cannot be accurately ascertained
may constitute irreparable damage. The question in
all cases is whether the remedy at law is under the circumstances of the case, full and complete. See Western Union Tel. v. Rogers, 42 N. J. Eq. 311.
The test to the right of equitable interposition is
not merely that there is a remedy at law; but it must
be plain and adequate, as practical and efficient to the
ends of justice and its prompt administration as the
remedy in equity. Erwin v. Louis 50 Miss 363.
The irreparability of a wrong is a conclusion
which the law draws from the character of the wrong,
and where the character of the wrong is exhibit~d in
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a statement of the facts which constitute it, it is for·
the court to detern1ine from the character of the act
whether- it is irreparable. See cases cited P 954.
We look at the particular acts charged and threatened, and the circumstances under which they were
done and threatened, to discover \vhether the damages
from them might be irreparable." Sidner v. Ha\V
Creek Tunrpike 91 Ind. 186; Cooper v. Hamilton 8 Blac.
F. (Ind. 377)
The court examines the facts charged and the na- ture and the character of the injury which may be inflicted by the acts complained of and thus determine
whether the injury may be irreparable, vel non. Puckette v. Hicks 39 La. Ann.- 901.
Page 945. It is sufficient that facts are alleged disclosing that plaLntiff is entitled to injunction without
alleging that the injury will be irreparable or the plaintiff will be without any adequate remedy at law. Weiss
v. Jackson County, 9 Ore. 470; Rood v. Mitchell County, 39 Ia. 444; Martin v. Jewell, 37 Md. 350.
Page .962. On the final hearing the court m~y decree a perpetual injunction, if it is necessary for complete ju-stice, although not prayer for in the bill. Sanderlin v. Backster, 76 Va. 299, citing Kerr inj. 637.
Page 962. An injunction may be granted on the
final hearing under a general prayer for relief.
Gaines v. Hale 26 Ark. 168.
African Me. Church v. Conover, 27 N. J. Ek. 137.
Fairbanks argues the contract does not use the words,
"good will" as part of the property sold to Valley. Contracts such as this one are generally construed as covering
and including the good will. If they were otherwise con-
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strued, what would the purchaser gain by the restrictive
covenant?
The California Court in Shafer v. Sloan, 3 Cal. App.
335, 85 Pac. 162, held that in a contract for the sale of a
business, a stipulation not to reengage in the business for
a fixed time, manifested an obvious intention of such contract to sell the good will of such business. In Wall v. Chapman, 84 Okla. 114, 202 Pac. 303 and. 304, we read:
"It is contended the contract does not refer to the
'good will' and the Court cannot read that into the
contract. This contract like all others must be interpreted so as to give effect to the mutual intention of
the parties. The same kind and character of contract
was upheld by this Court in Threlkeld v Steward 24
Okla. 403, 103 Pac. 630, 138 Am. St. Rep. 888."
The identical· kind and character of contract was
before the Court of Appeal of California, being Shafer
v Sloan 3 Cal. App. 335, 85 Pac. 162. The Court in the
third syllabus stated as follows:
The obvious intention of a contract for the sale
of a business, coupled with an agreement by the seller
not to engage in the business so long as the buyer continues in the business is to sell the good will of the business. ·under the facts pleaded and the contract itself
it is apparent it was the intention of the parties that
the sale of the good will of the business was within the
terms of the contract."
In Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 South (2) 240, 44,
the Court says;
"It is not essential that the contract for the sale
of a business expressly include the good will thereof.
Covenants designed, in the nature of them, to protect
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the good will of the business being sold, imply a sale
of good will.''
To the same effect see Maddox v. Fuller, 233 Ala. 662,
173 South 12; Davs v. Christopher, 219 Ala. 346, 122 South
406; Smith v. Webb, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1191, 4, 40 South
913, 176 Ala. 596; Nelson v. Johnson, 38 Minn. 255, 36 N.
W. 868, 9. 24 Am. Jur. 810 gives a positive statement of
the rule as above stated and host of citations. Anno. 18
Ann. Case 433; Anno. Ann. Cass. 1917A, 1015 ff.
It seems to us that it does appear from the complaint that the injury complained of cannot be compensated
in damages, and that it further appears that the remedy at
law would not be an efficient remedy, from the fact that it
clearly appears from the complaint, and the answer, that
the wrong complained of is a continuing wrong, and if an
action for damages had to be relied upon it would necessarily work a multiplicity of suits; this court, in common
with all other courts, has decided that where an injury is
a continuing one an injunction is the proper remedy. The
statement of facts set forth in the complaint conclusively
shows an injury and damage to the plaintiff. And from
the facts stated in this complaint it is so-evident that the
plaintiff would be damaged and the money judgments would.
afford no adequate protection, and that the acts complained
of, without injunction, will be continuing ones, that further
argument on the subject would be idle. See Silver v. Washington Inv. Co., 65 Wash. 576, 118 Pac. 749; Galbreath Gas
Co. v: Lindsey, 35 Okla. 235, 129 Pac. 45; Sickles v. Manhattan Gas Light Co., 64 How. Proc. (N ..Y.) 33.
If the facts stated in this complaint do not entitle Valley to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the Court and to receive the negative and preventive relief of injunction, then
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a statement to obtain such relief must needs be one either
replete with conclusion of the pleader or be filled with a
pleading of evidence. The Valley is without an adequate
remedy at law. A court of law could not prevent Fairbanks
from continuing the violation of his contract, as his answer
and defense indicates he intends to do, nor could it restore
the Valley to the position it would have were the restrictive
covenants observed; and the damages which the Valley
would sustain in the future by being faced with the business
competition of Fairbanks, in violation of his covenant,
would not only require a multiplicity of suits but would impose upon Valley the constant duty of seeking to recover
damages, the amount of which is difficult to ascertain, and
could not with any certainty be estimated. We conclude
with a statement from Dingley v. Buckner, Sheriff, 104
Pac. 480:
"In reply to the criticism of respondent that there
is no allegation of the insolvency of defendant, it is
sufficient to say that this is a false quantity where it
appeared in legal contemplation that the damage is
irreparable."
We submit the following additional citations as containing some terse and well reasoned statements and law
upon the matter: Crutchett v. ~awton, 139 Cal. App. 411;
33 Pac. (2) 839; Herrington v. Hackler, 181 Okla. 396 74
Pac. (2) 389; Youngman v. Calhoon, 321 S. W. 647.
Annotations: 58 A. L. R. 156-75; 3 A. L. R. 242; 82
A. L. R. 1033; 91 A. L. R. 985; 31 A. L. R. 1174 supplemented in 12 Pac. (2) 990; 99 Pac. (2) 434; 133 Pac. (2) 291;
127 A. L. R. 1152; Rowe v. Toon, 185 Ia. 848, 169 N. W.
38; Lashus v. Chamberlain, 6 Ut. 385, 24 Pac. 188.
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POINT 2
Question of Jury Trial
Another point noted, but scarcely argued by Fairbanks, is the fact that the court denied a jury trial. The
brief apparently concedes that if the action was primarily
equitable then ·the court committed no error in denying a
jury. We think, in view of what has been said in this brief,
there can be no question but that the action was primarily
equitable for injtmctive relief, and the matter of damages
merely incidental to the main purposes of the suit. Had
a jury been en1paneled, its verdict \vould only have been
advisory and could have been disregardedby the court. We
quote from The California Court of Appeals in Meek v.
Delatour, 2 Cal. App. 264, 83 Pac. 300, where the court
says:
''In such a case the verdict of the jury would be
advisory only, and neither party is entitled to a trial by
jury as a matter of right. Richardson v. City of Eureka, supra; Fisher v. Zumwait, supra. The demand
for damages is but incidental to the main purpose of
the suit (Courtwright v. Bear R. W. & M. Co., supra);
but, if it should be conceded that defendant may have
been entitled to have the question of damages deter..
mined by a jury, no such demand was made; but the
demand was for a ]ury to try the entire case.
It is not error to refuse a general demand for a
jury to try a cause consisting of legal and equitable
issues. 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 975; Greenleaf
v. Eagan, 30 Minn. 316, 15 N. W. 254; Lace v. Fixen,
39 Minn. 46, 38 N. W. 762; Peden v. Cavins, 134 Ind.
494, 34 N. E. 7, 39 Am. St. Rep. 276."
In the light ·of the legal reasoning and of the legal authorities as shown in the preceding pages of this brief, we
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think it is definitely established that this action is primar~
ily equitable; that it is basically an action for injWlction
and not for damages. If Fairbanks has been violating the
restrictive provisions of his contract it see1ns plain that the
only effective and efficient remedy to prevent continuance
of such breach is by an equitable interposition, judgment
for damages could not be presumed to stop further breachM
es, nor could it be presumed to place The Valley in the position it would have been were there no breaches of the
contract. In the light of these conditions, we see no escape
from the conclusion that the action is one in equity. If
Fairbanks is breaching his contract, The Valley is entitled
to injtL'1ctive relief as of course. If Fairbanks is not breachM
ing his contract, The Valley would not be entitled to a judgment for damages. Since Valley must prove its right to injunction before it can make any kind of a show of its rights
to damages, it must follow that the action sounds in equity
and that damages are merely incidental to and dependent
upon the determination of the equitable issues in favor of
The Valley. The action must therefore be held primarily
one for injunction and the right to darnages. merely inci~
dental to, and dependent on, Valley's right to injunctive relief. In such cases, the parties are not entitled to a jury
trial on the question of damages. 50 C. J. S. 751; Monmeier
v. Mcc·anister, 153 S. C. 422, 8 S. E. (2) · 737, 129 A. L. R.
880. Upion Oil v. Rleconstruction ·Oil, 20 Cal. App. (2) 170,
66 Pac. (2) 1215. Bellavance v. Plastic C'raft, 30 F. Supp.
37.
.Where the facts are not conceded and trial is necessary to determine plaintiff's right to the equitable relief
demanded, the court may retain jurisdiction and assess the
damage, even if plaintiff does not prove a case for injunc-
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tion. Miller v. Edison Electric, 184 N. Y. 17, 76 N. E. 734,
3 L. R. A. N. S. 1060, 6 Ann. Cass. 146. Tucker v. Edison
Electric, 91 N. Y. S. 439, 100 App. Div. 407, affirmed 76
N. E. 1110, 184 N. Y. 548.
In the instant case, since The Valley proved and established its primary right to equitable relief, the Court had the
right to assess the damages without a jury and therefore no
prejudice resulted to Fairbanks and no error was committed
by the Court in denying his motion for a jury trial. Incidentally, we again call attention to the authorities supra to the
effect that had Fairbanks been entitled to a jury, which he
was not, on the question of damages, the Court was justified in denying his demand which was made for jury trial
of the whole cause and not merely of the damage issue.
POIN'T 3
Interpretation of the Contract

Fairbanks contends in Point 3 that the contract only
bound him not to build or maintain within the restricted
area a physical plant in which he would conduct a general
undertaking establishment and business; that as long as
he did not maintain and operate the physical plant-the
building commonly called an undertaking parlor or a funeral home-within the restricted area, he was free to en·gage in all the activities in which morticians, undertakers,
embalmers and funeral directors usually engage; in other
words, he could run free competition to The Valley within
the area as long as he kept his building outside of the area.
A simple statement of the proposition is its own answer
and establishes its inconsistency and incongruity. The
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in these days of
free movement, good roads, and fast and easy travel, the
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undertaker is not confined in his business to the narrow
limitations of a single community; that the corpse is no
longer washed, embalmed and kept in the home by "wake"
until time for the obsequies; that the usual practice is for
the undertaker to remove the body promptly after death
to an establishment specially fitted and equipped for convenience in performing the duties he must. perform in preparation for the final obsequies and interr.oent of the body.
The court will also judicially know that it is the common
practice for the undertaker (mortician, he now prefers to
be called) to provide convenient and comfortable transportation for the family of deceased to his establishment or
other convenient place for selection of caskets, clothes, etc.;
and that he generally procures the death certificate, the
burial permit, and makes the arrangement for the grave.
In the instant case Fairbanks testified that he genarally did
all those things; that they were included in his services and
charges. After Fairbanks has done all these things for deceased, or the family, \Vha t remains for the person who
bought the business to do? But that is not all: he also
claims the right to conduct the obsequies, direct the funeral
procession and inter the body. The only thing he does not
claim the right to do is to speak the funeral sermon. All
other things he claims he may do, as long as he does not
maintain an embalrning house, his physical plant, within the
restricted area.
We presume The Valley would have no cause for complaint, nor make any, if Fairbanks built a mortuary build·
ing in every town of the district, as long as no business was
done therein. Fairbanks sola to Valley a physical plant,
a stock of goods, and a going business, with its good will,
and he covenanted that he would not operate or engage in
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the "mortuary or funeral business" \vithin the restricted
area. Good will is an incident to business; it is part of the
intangible assets of a business; it cannot be segregated or
sold apart from the business, because it does not exist apart
from the business. 24 Am. Jur. 804, 5; Anno. Ann. Cass.
1914 B 879; Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., v. Salt Lake Co., 60 Ut.
491, 512, 210 Pac. 106, 27 A. L. R. 874. It cannot attach
to or be a· part of- the building; it cannot pass by a sale of
real estate. Its value as an element of value in the purchase qf a business lies in the fact that the seller thereby
eliminates himself as a competitor, so the purchaser can
build his trade free from competition with the seller. ManyCourts say the seller is obligated not only to refrain from
competition but to use his influence if occasion presents to
recomrnend to his trade or patrons or customers that they
deal with the purchaser.
For the court to construe the contract as Fairbanks
now contends would require it to make a new contract for
the parties. Fairbanks agreed not to operate or engage in
the "mortuary or funeral business." In his brief he gives
one of the definitions of the word "funeral", but he does not
define ''funeral business.'' This term is defined as all- business done in procuring the interment of a corpse. See Vol.
2, Bouvier, 1329; also Black's Law Dictionary. · Mortuary
is defined inter alia as pertaining to the burial of the dead;
"it is applied to many subjects connected with death ·and
burial." Ency. Brittanica Vol. 15. The New York Court
in People v. Ringe, 110 N. Y. S. 923, 1235 ·App. Div. 572,
holds that a funeral covers the matter of disposition of bodies of human beings after death, or the work of the undertaker. A mortician is an undertaker; a mortician's business
is an undertaker's business; an undertaker's or mortician's
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business is the business of doing the thing, or rendering the
services, or parts of them, connected with the disposal of
the dead bodies of human beings from death to interment.
City of Tucson v. Arizona Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495, 272 Pac.
923.
The agreement involved in this action provides that
Fairbanks will not operate or engage in the mortuary or
funeral business. It is urged that the Court should disregard the word business and construe the provision as just
prohibiting a physical plant. There is no rule of interpre·
tation that sustains this view. Business does not mean a
building, or stock, or machinery, or capital, or caskets and
the like. While business pertaining to the dead cannot be
done without these, in commercial language it is as distinct
fron1 them as labor is from capital. In speaking of the
business that may be done by a mortician, undertaker, or
funeral director, the mind does not contemplate or dwell
upon the character, or quality of the means used, but upon
the operations, whether great or small, complex or simple,
numerous or few, for one or the other of these conditions
may arise from much or little stock or capital. In other
words, business does not mean caskets, coaches, embalming
fluids or the like. Business is not these lifeless and dead
things, but the activity in which they are employed. When
in motion, then the owners or actors are said to be in business; and then it is that undertakers and others speak of be·
ing in business. Business denotes the employment or activity in which one engages to make a living for profit.
The testimony of Fairbanks narrating his activities within the restricted_ district and the charges he made therefor, certainly manifests that he was engaged in it for
profit; it is not consistent with the thought of it being a
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charitable act. In Ragsdale v. Nagle, 106 Cal. 332, 39 Pac.
628, a seller sold his abstract business and good will, agre~
ing not to carry on a similar business. The court held that
searching for titles \vas a business and enjoined the same.
If the contract were construed as Fairbanks would have it,
the whole restrictive clause would by nugatory, and an absurdity.
POINT 4
}latter of Testimony

The remaining point; number 4, in Fairbanks' brief, is
the statement that the Court disregarded the testimony of
vvitnesses for the defendant that had the services of Fairbanks not been available to them they would not -have given
their funeral work to The Valley. We are unable to say
from a· perusal of the judgment of the Court that he disregarded such testimony, because the Court does not indicate whether he did or did not disregard it; whether he did
or did not consider it. However, we think the Court was
justified in, and shoUld disregard it because the testimony
was wholly irrelevant and immaterial. Furthermore, if the
Court did disregard the testimony, and if he should have
regarded it, the judgment should still be affirmed. This
being an equitable matter, the Court may try the' matter
here de novo on the reeord, and we think if the Court did
so it would come to the same conclusions as the trial court,
except, we believe, Valley was entitled to a greater judgment for damages than was awarded by the trial court.
The measure of damages recoverable for breach of the covenant such as that herein involved, is the value of the business lost to the plaintiff. As indicated in the authorities
cited before in this brief, such damages are difficult of
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measurement, and many courts have said that itself is amply sufficient to make the case one in equity and to lay full
basis for injunctive relief. Generally such damages are
largely speculative, like damages a warded in tort cases f<?r
pain and suffering. There is no gauge by which they can
be measured with any certainty whatever, but that does
not detract from a right to recover damages, although it
may be added reason why the court and not the jury should
determine them. Cooper v. Anchor Securities, 16 Wash. 2d
306, 133 Pac. (2) 291, is a case passing upon the measure
of damages in a case involving breach of restrictive covenants such as here and cites other leading cases on the subject. We also direct attention to the annotation on that
question in Ann. Cass. 1914 A on Page 1153, where the
courts indicate the elements that enter into such measurement.
Citing Lashus v. Chamberlain, 5 Ut. 140; 13 Pac. 361.
See also Merager v. Turnbull, 2 Wash. 711, 99 Pac. (2) 434,
127 A. L. R. 1154
We submit that The Vlalley in its complaint stated an
action primarily and essentially in equity, with a claim for
damages for past breaches incidental to its case for injunctive relief; that upon the trial The Valley amply sustained
the burden of proof upon every issue; that Fairbanks failed
to show any meritorious defense, that his pleading and his
own testimony conclusively establish that The Valley was
~ntitled to the injunction and to their damages, even in a
larger amount than the trial court a warded; that there is
no error appearing in the record, on the part of the trial
court, unless it be in 'the smallness of the damages a\varded
against Fairbanks for his willful and deliberate breach of
his covenants and that the judgment should be affir1ned.
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The books are replete with cases where parties have
sold their business, their good will, and entered into a covenant, for \Vhich they received valuable consideration, to
refrain from entering into business in competition with the
person to whom they had sold their business and good will,
and then repenting of \Vhat they had done, or, as here, deliberately disregarding their covenant. In such cases the
courts have uniformly enjoined further breaches and usually made an award of damages, all in equity. Fairbanks
ventures the suggestion that he should not be held to his
contract because he thinks now he may have made a poor
bargain, and that to hold him to the contract might be hard
on him financially. That question, too, has been raised before, and the courts have said, in sound logic, that is no
ground for relief. See Yanka v. Goldberg, 110 N. J. Eq.
170; 137 Atlantic 645; Dellacorte v. -Gentile, 98 N. J. Eq.
194, 129 A.tl. 739; Streeter v. Bush, 25 Calif. 68, 72. See
note on page 890 of 138 Am. St. Rpts.
Fairbanks may think that he sold his birthright for
a mess of pottage, but it is not recorded in Holy Writ that
the other Esau was allowed to, or ever tried, to welch on
his bargain, and we submit that the Court is not going to
let Fairbanks do so either.
Respectfully submitted,
DAL,LAS H. YOlJNG
MARTIN M. LARSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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